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Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan: How
Congress, Without Quite Saying So, Can Erect
a Trade Barrier
I. Introduction
Mississippi Poulty Ass'n v. Madigan' reveals the bitterness of the
debate within the judiciary over methodologies of statutory interpreta-
tion: functionalism versus formalism, activism versus restraint.2 In Mis-
sissippi Poulty the Fifth Circuit splits eight to seven s the majority and
dissent each accusing the other ofjudicial activism and of overstepping
the proper bounds of the judiciary by seeking to decide matters of
trade policy. 4 The substance of the debate in Mississippi Poultry is regu-
lation of foreign-produced imported poultry. Such a springboard
opens up questions involving not only theories of judicial methodol-
ogy, but also the very broad question of the proper balance of power
between branches of our government. 5 Who is actually taking, or be-
ing forced to take, responsibility for making trade policy in this case?
Is it the executive branch, via the Secretary of Agriculture's regula-
tions? Is it the court, by deciding the case? Has Congress fulfilled its
role by clearly expressing the trade policy it desires? Or has it instead
shirked some of its proper responsibility?
While the questions thus posed by Mississippi Poultry are broad in-
deed, the specific question before the Fifth Circuit was narrowly fo-
cused. The Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) 6 requires that
imported poultry meet the "same" quality standards as domestically
produced poultry, and be processed in facilities and under conditions
that are the "same" as those in the United States.7 The Secretary of
1 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
2 Id. These themes run throughout the case; the dissenting opinion in particular
brings these dichotomies into focus. Id. at 310 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
3 CircuitJudge Wiener writes the majority opinion, joined by CircuitJudges King, Gar-
wood, Smith, Duhe, Garza, De Moss, and Stewart. Circuit Judge Higginbotham writes the
dissent, joined by Chief Judge Politz and Circuit Judges Reavley, Jolly, Davis, Jones, and
Barksdale. Circuit Judges Benavides and Parker did not participate. Id. at 293-94.
4 Id. at 309-10 (majority indicating that they are the ones staying within the proper
judicial role), and id. at 310 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting) (explicitly questioning the activist
effect of the majority's methodologies).
5 Id.
6 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7 Id. § 466(d).
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Agriculture (Secretary), in charge of implementing this statute,8 inter-
preted this to mean that foreign poultry must meet quality standards
and be produced in facilities and under conditions that are at least
"equal" to those in the United States. 9 The simple question then is
whether the Secretary's interpretation, "equal," conflicts with Con-
gress' intent when it said "same." 10
Mississippi Poultry should have been just a simple application of the
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council two-part test for judi-
cial review of an agency action.1 1 Yet the Fifth Circuit's eight to seven
split reveals that application of Chevron in this case was problematic at
best. The eight-member majority invalidates the Secretary's regulation
as outside the pale of what Congress intended; it says that the dissent
seeks to make policy by ignoring the structure of the PPIA and subse-
quent enactments by Congress.1 2 The seven-member dissent, on the
other hand, would uphold the Secretary's regulation. The dissent
maintains that it is the majority who overreaches its proper role and
makes a policy decision and that, in order to do so, it makes use of
methodologies from opposite extremes: it both ignores the text with a
"flood of legalisms and words that abstract and shrink the visage of
textual command," and also employs "an exacting literalism that re-
fuses to read words in context."' 3
How could an interpretation of the words "same" and "equal" war-
rant such an evenly balanced division of opinion as the eight to seven
split indicates, and in which the majority and dissent each defends its
belief so zealously? One factor that cannot be overlooked is that the
result of even so seemingly insignificant an inquiry as the meaning of
the word "same" has a vast impact on international trade relations. 14
Hinging on the interpretation of the word "same" are questions of pro-
tectionism for American business,15 a possible de facto ban on the im-
portation of foreign-produced poultry, 16 and the unknown effect of
8 "The Secretary (of Agriculture] may by regulations prescribe the conditions under
which poultry products capable of use as human food, shall be stored or otherwise handled
by any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, freezing, storing, or transporting, in
or for commerce, or importing, such articles, whenever the Secretary deems such action
necessary to assure that such articles will not be adulterated or misbranded when delivered to
the consumer." Id. § 463(a).
9 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (1994).
10 Mississippi Poultry Ass'n. v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
I Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
See infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chevron test.
12 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 301-02.
13 Id. at 310 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
14 The dissent said that the court's holding may result in a "virtual ban" on the importa-
tion of poultry. Id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The majority conceded that the
Secretary's interpretation, which it invalidates, may be the better policy and that Congress'
decision may be "ill-advised." Id. at 309-10.
15 See id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
16 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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such a policy on the attitudes of those nations with whom we trade.17
Part II of this Note will analyze the means by which the majority
and dissent arrive at their opinions, and Parts III and IV will explain
the comparative strengths and weaknesses of these arguments in light
of the history of the regulation of imported poultry and the relevant
administrative law. Consideration will also be given, in Part IV, to ques-
tions of methodology, the proper role of the judiciary, and the balance
of power issues. This Note will also address Mississippi Poultry's effect
on international trade relations'8 and will discuss the opinion's
strength and staying power.' 9
II. Statement of the Case
The facts of Mississippi Poultry seem simple, centering squarely
upon one phrase in an amendment to the Poultry Products Inspection
Act20 and one phrase in the PPIA's implementing regulations. 21 Con-
gress' amendment to the PPIA, as part of the Food Security Act of 1985
(1985 Farm Bill), 22 provided that all imported poultry "shall . . . be
subject to the same inspection, sanitary, [and] quality ... standards
applied to products produced in the United States," and shall be
"processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as those
under which similar products are processed in the United States."23 In
1989 the Secretary of Agriculture released the final rule interpreting
the amendment and explaining that it means that foreign systems must
provide standards "at least equal" to the federal system of poultry in-
17 Id. at 296-97. The majority noted that, in conjunction with the 1968 amendments to
the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), the concern was expressed in a House Report
that more stringent regulation of imports, when such regulation was unnecessary, might re-
sult "in the enactment of measures abroad which could hamper the exportation of U.S.
slaughtered poultry and poultry products, the volume of which far exceeds the imports."
H.R. RFP. No. 1333, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3426, 3428-
29.
18 See discussion infra part V.
19 See discussion infra part V.
20 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
21 9 C.F.R. §§ 381.1-.311 (1994).
22 1985 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1701, 99 Stat. 1354, 1633 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 466(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
23 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1). This section reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law... all poultry, or parts or prod-
ucts thereof, capable of use as human food offered for importation into the
United States shall-
(A) be subject to the same inspection, sanitary, quality, species verifica-
tion, and residue standards applied to products produced in the United States;
and
(B) have been processed in facilities and under conditions that are the
same as those under which similar products are processed in the United States.
Id.
Prior to this statutory change, the PPIA did not provide the Secretary of Agriculture
(Secretary) with specific standards to be imposed on foreign poultry products, but instead
granted the Secretary broad discretion to ensure that imported poultry was "healthful, whole-
some, [and] fit for human food." I. § 466(a).
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spection within the United States. 24
The Mississippi Poultry Association and the National Broiler
Council (the Poultry Associations), contending that there was a differ-
ence between Congress' "same as" language in section 466(d) and the
Secretary's "equal to" language,25 filed suit in the Southern District of
Mississippi seeking to have the regulation invalidated as arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.2 6 Judge Wingate
held the Secretary's regulation invalid, reasoning that Congress' lan-
guage was unambiguous and that its intent was clear.27 He concluded
that if dire trade implications occur, it is a matter for Congress, not for
the courts. 28
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a three-member
panel split two to one, with Judges Wiener and King affirming the Dis-
trict Court's invalidation of the regulation and Judge Reavley filing a
lengthy dissent.29 Judges Wiener and King concluded, based on both
the structure of the PPIA and on the subsequent enactment of the
24 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (1994) reads in pertinent part:
(a) (2) The determination of acceptability of a foreign poultry inspection sys-
tem for purposes of this section shall be based on an evaluation of the foreign
program in accordance with the following requirements and procedures:
(i) The system shall have a program organized and administered by the
national government of the foreign country. The system as implemented must
provide standards at least equal to those of the Federal system of poultry inspec-
tion in the United States with respect to:
(a) Organizational structure ...
(b) Ultimate control and supervision by the national government...
(c) The assignment of competent, qualified inspectors...
(d) Authority ... to enforce law and regulations ...
(e) Adequate administrative and technical support;
(f) The inspection, sanitation, quality, species verification, and resi-
due standards applied to products produced in the United States...
iv) The foreign inspection system must maintain a program to assure that
the requirements referred to in this section, at least equal to those applicable to
the Federal system in the United States, are being met.
Id. (emphasis added).
25 The plaintiffs, Mississippi Poultry Association and National Broiler Council (the Poul-
try Associations), contended specifically that the "at least equal to" standard would allow for
subjective evaluation of foreign poultry requirements, would permit standards less than those
in the United States, and would create an unfair competitive advantage for foreign poultry
producers. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 790 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (S.D. Miss. 1992),
aff'd, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd on reh'g, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
26 5 U.S.C. §§ 55-706 (1988). The Poultry Associations argued that the structure of the
PPIA itself and Congress' subsequent action in the 1990 Farm Bill supported the conclusion
that Congress intended foreign producers to be subject to identical, rather than equivalent,
standards, facilities, and conditions as domestic producers. Mississippi Poultry, 790 F. Supp. at
1284. The Secretary, on the other hand, argued that Congress' requirement of "the same"
standards and facilities was ambiguous, and that therefore due deference must be given to
the agency's regulation, id.; and that a standard of identicality would bring about dire trade
implications, and would in effect preclude importation of any foreign poultry products into
the United States. Id. at 1290.
27 Mississippi Poultry, 790 F. Supp. at 1290.
28 I1.
29 Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd on reh'g, 31
F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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1990 Farm Bill, that Congress has "made clear that 'the same as' re-
quires identical inspection and processing procedures,". and that
"[r]egardless of whether Congress' choice should prove to be unwise
or disruptive, that choice itself has been made absolutely."3 0 Judge
Reavley's dissent, on the other hand, maintained that Congress did not
in fact choose between identicality and equivalency when it said
"same," and that Judges Wiener and King ignored evidence that would
have established that fact.3 1
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the invalidation
of the Secretary's regulation in an eight to seven split.3 2 The majority
reasoned that the Secretary's regulation must be invalidated because
the structure of the PPIA, the text, and subsequent enactments all sup-
port the conclusion that Congress' intent was clear and unambiguous
in requiring identicality between foreign and domestic systems;. and
that under Chevron,3 3 the court's inquiry is complete once clear intent
is found.3 4 Whether or not Congress has made a wise policy choice is
beyond the power of either the court or the implementing agency to
change.3 5
The dissent, on the other hand, found that Congress' phrasing in
the statute was ambiguous, and thus it would uphold the Secretary's
regulation.3 6 It reasoned that the majority had overstepped its proper
judicial role by at one time submitting the text to a literalism that de-
fies true intent, and at other times ignoring the text and relying in-
stead on legislative history.3 7 The majority, according to the dissent,
ignored the common sense reading of "same" standards to refer to an
already unified domestic standard system. By ignoring common sense,
the majority produced an absurd result which will have a drastic conse-
quence for international trade, namely, a virtual ban on importation of
poultry from foreign producers.3 8
Both the majority and the dissent address the same six issues in
reaching their respective opinions: Standard of Review, Text, Struc-
ture/History of the PPIA, Legislative History, Subsequent Enactments,
and Policy.3 9
30 Id. at 1367-68.
31 Id. at 1368 (Reavley,J., dissenting).
32 Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also
supra note 3.
33 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
See discussion infra part III.B.1.
34 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 299 n.34.
35 Id. at 310.
36 Id. at 312, 316 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 310 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
38 Id (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 295-316. Each side, as can be expected, puts emphasis on different arguments
in trying to discern Congress' intent.
The majority relied most heavily on structural/historical analyses and subsequent enact-
ments. Id. at 295-305. In fact, the majority began its opinion with a section it entitles "Back-
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A. Reasoning of the Majority
The majority held that the Secretary's regulation must be invali-
dated because Congress' intent was clear and unambiguous in requir-
ing identicality between foreign and domestic systems, 40 and that
under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council4 the court's
inquiry is complete once clear intent is found.42 Whether or not Con-
gress has made a wise policy choice is beyond the power of either the
court or the implementing agency to change. 4
3
1. Standard of Review
The first factor examined by the majority was the standard of re-
view. The majority stated that the standard to be used for reviewing an
agency's interpretation of the statute it administers is set forth in Chev-
ron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.4 4 Chevron established a
two-step test: (1) Has Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed
its intent in the plain language of the statute? If so, that is the end of
the matter and Congressional intent must be given effect. (2) But if
the language of the statute is ambiguous or silent on the particular
issue, the reviewing court asks only whether the agency's interpretation
is reasonable.45 Thus, the Mississippi Poultry majority phrased the ques-
tion presented on appeal as "whether the Secretary's implementation
of [section 466(d)] through an 'at least equal to' standard is unam-
biguously foreclosed by the statutory language 'the same.' ",46
2. Text
The second issue examined was textual interpretation. The ma-
jority presented two textual arguments to support its assertion that
Congress meant identical when it said "same": The first relied on the
dictionary meanings and on "common usage;"47 the second relied on a
ground," which is in reality a lengthy structural analysis buttressed at the end by arguments
from subsequent enactments. Id. at 295-98. It then proceeded to its "Discussion," in which it
sets out the standard of review before taking up in turn "Text," "Structure and History," and
"Subsequent Enactments." Id. at 298-305. The majority ends with a section entitled "Other
Matters," in which it addresses and attempts to refute the Secretary's arguments concerning
legislative history, the weight to be given to textual analysis, and the court's role in policy-
making. Id. at 305-10.
The dissent relied mainly on textual arguments, structural arguments, and legislative
history, and it is animated throughout by a "common sense" approach which reasons that an
interpretation that brings about absurd policy results cannot have been intended by Con-
gress. Id. at 310-16 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
40 Id at 308.
41 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See dis-
cussion infra part III.B.1.
42 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
43 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 310.
44 Id. at 298-99 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837).
45 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
46 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 299.
.47 Id. at 300.
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reading of the term "the same" in the broader context of the statute.48
First, the majority argued that even though the word "same" has a
range of dictionary meanings stretching from "selfsame" and "identi-
cal" to "equal to," nevertheless common usage treats "same" and "iden-
tical" as synonyms; thus, common usage unambiguously excludes "at
least equal to" as an acceptable definition.49 As the basis for its reason-
ing, the majority stated that "of course common usage provides accept-
able grounds on which to parse statutory terms into primary,
secondary, and other meanings."50
In his argument, the Secretary had relied on National Railroad Pas-
senger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.51 for the proposition that the pres-
ence of alternative dictionary definitions for a term, each making some
sense under the statute, compels a conclusion that the term is ambigu-
ous. The Secretary had argued that since there is a definition for "the
same" that supports an equivalency standard, the court must find the
term ambiguous and defer to the Secretary's interpretation.52 The ma-
jority responded first by stating that since almost any word in the dic-
tionary was given more than one sense-making definition, such an
approach would effectively make all statutory terms ambiguous, a re-
sult which would dramatically shift power from Congress to the admin-
istrative agencies.53 Moreover, such a "dictionary rule" was ruled out
by Chevron and Boston & Maine itself. Both cases "counsel reviewing
courts to look at structure and other traditional tools of statutory con-
struction" instead of putting all weight on the dictionary meanings. 54
Second, the majority, after a contextual reading, reasoned that it
was clear that Congress has itself affirmatively acted to exclude "at least
equal to" as a proper synonym for "the same." 55 The argument was
that Congress used both the phrases "at least equal to" and "the same"
in the PPIA and distinguished between them in meaning.56 It used "at
least equal to" as its term of art for "different but functionally equal or
better," in the domestic intrastate context, and chose to use "the same"
as its term of art for the standards to apply to imported poultry.57
Therefore, the majority concluded, when the Secretary sought to use
48 I1.
49 Id.
50 Id. (citing Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991); Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989); and John Doe Agency v.John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153
(1989)).
51 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1402 (1992). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text.
52 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 307.
53 Id.
54 Id.; see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394,
1402 (1992); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
55 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 300.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 293, 300.
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"at least equal to" as an interpretation for "the same," he acted arbitrar-
ily and capriciously.58 This is because when Congress uses particular
language in one section in a statute, but does not use it in another
section of the same statute, it is an indication that Congress specifically
intends to omit it.5 9
3. Structure/History of the PPIA
Conceding that textual arguments alone are not enough to be
conclusive, 60 the majority then turned to structural arguments. The
crux of the argument was that, based on the way the PPIA is designed,
if an ."at least equal" standard is applied to foreign producers, it will
result in a great advantage to foreign producers over domestic produ-
cers, an advantage that Congress did not intend. The majority made
this argument in several steps. First, the majority asserted that the
PPIA was designed not only to protect consumers from tainted prod-
ucts, but also "to protect the domestic poultry market from unfair com-
petition."61 Second, the PPIA created one uniform and detailed
regulatory scheme for the national interstate market, which was to be
distinguished from the system for regulating intrastate sales;62 im-
ported poultry, however, could be sold domestically as long as it was
not "unhealthful, unwholesome, [or] adulterated."63
When Congress amended the PPIA in 1968, it extended regula-
tion to poultry sold intrastate; the states were not made to comply with
the federal program itself, but their inspection programs were to be "at
least equal to" the federal one before they could offer poultry for sale
intrastate. 64 So for domestically produced poultry, the only products
that could be sold interstate were those inspected "under THE federal
program" and "according to THE uniform federal standards."65 The
PPIA still regulated imported poultry without much detail from Con-
gress, leaving the specifics to the Secretary,66 and at this time the Sec-
retary had promulgated regulations allowing poultry products to be
imported only if the inspection standards used were the "substantial
equivalent" of domestic ones. 67
In 1972, the Secretary revised the regulations for imported poultry
and required that foreign inspection standards be "at least equal to"
58 Id. at 300.
59 Id. at 301 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1971)).
60 I1. at 300.
61 Id at 295 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1988)).
62 Id, at 296.
63 21 U.S.C. § 466(a) (1988).
64 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 296 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 454(a)(1968)).
65 Id. (referring to 9 C.F.R. §§ 381.1-.311 (1994)).
66 See 21 U.S.C. § 466(a) (1968).
67 7 C.F.R. § 18.301 (1972).
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domestic ones.68 The majority maintained that this regulation re-
sulted in great unfairness because a foreign producer could sell inter-
state if the poultry was inspected under standards "at least equal to"
the domestic ones, but domestic producers who met that same stan-
dard could only sell intrastate. 69 This gave foreign producers an ad-
vantage over domestic producers70 which, according to the majority,
Congress would certainly not do, considering its concern that domestic
industry be protected from unfair trade practices. 71
At this juncture, the majority points out, Congress amended the
PPIA via the 1985 Farm Bill, stating that imported poultry "shall ... be
subject to the same ... inspection standards" and "processed in facili-
ties and under conditions that are the same as those under which simi-
lar products are processed in the United States."72 The majority
reasoned that this was a clear mandate for regulating foreign poultry
products identically to domestic poultry destined for the same market;
that is, that it was a command to make foreign producers comply with
the federal regulatory program. 73 Therefore, according to the major-
ity, when the Secretary in 1989 retained the "at least equal to" stan-
dard, it was an act of "effrontery" on his part.
74
It was in response to this, said the majority, that Congress enacted
the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (1990 Farm Bill),
Section 2507 of which specifically addresses PPIA Section 466(d)'s "the
same" language and the Secretary's regulation. 75 This section states
that the regulation "does not reflect the intention of the Congress,"
and "urge[s] the Secretary ... to repeal the Oct. 31, 1989 regulation
and promulgate a new regulation reflecting the intention of the Con-
gress."76 When the regulations remained unaltered, the Poultry As-
sociations sought certainty by turning to the judicial branch, filing suit
in district court.77
In sum, concluded the majority, the structure of the PPIA is
plain:78 Domestic poultry producers can sell their products, but only
in intrastate commerce, if they comply with state inspection programs
that provide standards "at least equal to" those of the federal pro-
gram. 79 If a domestic poultry producer wishes to sell his product in
interstate commerce, that producer must comply with the federal
68 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (1994).
69 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 297.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 295.
72 1985 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1701, 99 Stat. 1354, 1633 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 466(d)(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
73 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 297.
74 Id. at 297-98.
75 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69.
76 Id. at 4069.
77 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 298.
78 Id. at 301.
79 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 454 (1988)).
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program.80
Likewise the history of the PPIA regarding imports is plain, said
the majority.81 The majority stated that the Secretary basically had two
choices for regulation in 1972: "either to require imported poultry to
comply with the standards applied to all poultry sold in interstate com-
merce-i.e., the federal standards-or to adopt an 'at least equal to'
standard as used for the poultry sold in intrastate commerce under
state programs."82 The majority then said it was to the "surprise and
dismay" of all concerned that the Secretary followed the intrastate ap-
proach by choosing the "at least equal to" standard.8 3
The majority reasoned from this that when Congress in 1985 re-
jected the "at least equal to" approach and explicitly provided that im-
ported poultry must meet "the same" standards applied to products
produced in the United States, only one "inescapable conclusion"
could be drawn: That when Congress stated "the same" standards it
intended imported poultry to be held to the federal standards. 84 The
majority believed that the referent for the term "the same" was plain,85
and that "by adopting the 'at least equal to' standard, the Secretary was
or could be treating imported and domestic interstate poultry in a sub-
stantially different manner. 86
4. Subsequent Enactments
The majority also believed that two subsequent acts of Congress
confirmed their conclusion that "the same" is an unambiguous refer-
ence to the federal program of regulations:87 the 1990 Farm Bill 88 and
the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
(NAFTA Act Amendments).89
After establishing that the value of the subsequent legislation,
which can range anywhere from being "of great weight"90 to having
"persuasive value"91 to being "of little assistance," 92 was dependent on






85 I at 302.
86 Id
87 Id
88 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69.
89 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§ 361(e), 107 Stat. 2057, 2123-24 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Act).
90 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 302 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 380-81 (1969)).
91 Id (citing Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983)).
92 Id (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 429 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
[VOL. 20
1995] ERECTING TRADE BARRIERS
Bill. 93
With respect to the 1990 Farm Bill, the majority found it "highly
persuasive" because of four factors:
(1) substantial overlap in membership between the Congress that
passed the 1985 Farm Bill and the Congress that passed section 2507
[of the 1990 Farm Bill]; 94 (2) the close temporal proximity between
the passage of the 1985 Farm Bill and of section 2507; (3) unmistaka-
ble specificity and directness with which section 2507 addressed the
Secretary's interpretation; and (4) the alacrity with which Congress
through section 2507 responded to the Secretary's interpretation.
95
The majority believed that Congress amended section 466(d)
again with the enactment of the 1993 NAFTA Act Amendments, be-
cause the NAFTA amendment "by its very terms" distinguished "the
same" from an "equivalency standard." 96 The majority reasoned that
because Congress juxtaposed "the same" and "at least equal to" in the
language of the NAFTA Act Amendments, Congress showed that the
two were not meant to be synonyms.
97
93 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69. Section 2507 of
the 1990 Farm Bill reads:
(a) FINDINGS. Congress finds that:
(1) in 1985 the [PPIA], an act to maintain the integrity and wholesome-
ness of this Nation's food supply, was amended by the Food Security Act of
1985;
(2) the 1985 amendment provided that poultry products offered for im-
portation into the United States shall be subject to the same inspection, sani-
tary, quality, species verification, and residue standards applied to products
produced in the United States and that such products shall have been
processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as those under
which similar products are processed in the United States; and
(3) on October 30, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture... promulgated a
regulation implementing the 1985 amendment to that Act providing that a for-
eign inspection system seeking certification for export of poultry to the United
States merely impose requirements at least equal to those applicable in the
United States.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that:
(1) the regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture . . . with
respect to poultry products offered for importation into the United States does
not reflect the intention of the Congress; and
(2) to urge the Secretary ... to repeal the October 30, 1989 regulation
and promulgate a new regulation reflecting the intention of the Congress.
Id.
94 The court notes that 435 members of the Congress that passed Section 2507 of the
1990 Farm Bill were also members of the Congress that added the "same" language to Sec-
tion 466(d) of the PPIA as part of the 1985 Farm Bill. Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 303 n.58.
95 Id. at 303.
96 Id. Section 361(e) of the NAFTA Act provides that:
(2) (A) ... all poultry... [imported] into the United States from Canada and
Mexico shall:
(i) comply with paragraph (1) [a reference to the phrase "the same" in
section 466(d) of the PPIA]; or
(ii) (I) be subject to . . . standards that are equivalent to United States
standards; and
(II) have been processed in facilities and under conditions that meet stan-
dards that are equivalent to United States standards.
NAFTA Act, supra note 89, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361(e), 107 Stat. 2057, 2123-24 (1993).
97 Mississippi Poulty, 31 F.3d at 304.
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Moreover, the majority found it even more significant that the ap-
plication of the Secretary's interpretation to the NAFTA Act Amend-
ments would violate the elementary canon of statutory construction
that "a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inop-
erative." 98 The reasoning was that if "the same" and "equivalent to"
were meant to be the same standard, then the NAFTA Act's use of the
disjunctive "or" would render one of the two phrases in the Act "sheer
surplusage." 99
5. Legislative History
Legislative history was taken up next. The majority, responding to
the Secretary's contention that the legislative history of the 1985 Farm
Bill supports his position that "the same" is ambiguous, sought to
quash such a contention with two arguments. First, an appeal to legis-
lative history was "not well taken" when the text was unambiguous to
begin with. 100 And second, even if the court could consider legislative
history despite the unambiguous language of the statute, its instructive
value in this case was "not nearly as lucid as the Secretary would have
us believe." 101
The legislative history of the 1985 Farm Bill revealed that when
the Bill was introduced to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry, the amendment to section 17(d) (section 466(d) as
codified) contained the "at least equal to" standard.'0 2 It was at this
point that Senator Jesse Helms, as Chairman of this Committee, de-
leted the phrase "at least equal to" and replaced it with "the same,"
explaining on the floor of the Senate that "the same" needed to be
added as a "technical and clarifying amendment.., to reflect the origi-
nal intent of the committee." 03 The majority reasoned that because
the Senators apparently accepted and understood this change without
debate, it was "strong evidence that the sense of the committee know-
ingly and intentionally became the sense of the Senate."10 4 The major-
ity said that the Secretary, on the other hand, defied logic in his
attempt to show that this bit of legislative history revealed anything but
complete or nearly complete unanimity of Congress in its intent to
require foreign producers to comply with the federal regulations
98 Id. (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237,
249 (1985)).
99 d.
100 Id. (citing Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1392 (1992); Railroad Comm'n v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1992); and Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112
S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)).
101 Id.
102 1985 Farm Bill, S. RaP. No. 99-145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 339-40 (1985), reprinted in
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 2005-06.
103 131 CONG. REc. 33,358 (1985).





The Secretary had argued that from a policy standpoint, an
equivalency standard is best because it "protects American consumers
from unhealthful, unwholesome, or adulterated products while al-
lowing foreign poultry products to be imported at reasonable costs." 106
Imposition of standards identical with the federal program, the Secre-
tary asserted, would raise costs to a prohibitive, protectionist level with-
out any corresponding increase in the safety and quality of the
imported product because they are already equal by his standard. 10 7
The majority responded by saying that what was to be eliminated
by the invalidation of the regulation was the Secretary's practice of
"certifying foreign programs in globo as 'at least equal to' the federal
one."10 8 Moreover, the majority argues, the holding does not pro-
scribe all variations from the federal standards, for the Secretary can
still "approve discrete, authorized variations of the type commonly ap-
proved under the federal standards." 10 9 In contrast, the majority says,
what the Secretary would do is to operate under a "wholly different
scheme of regulation that-while it may arguably be a better scheme-
is not the one authorized or established by Congress." 110
In addition, the majority pointed, out that the Secretary's policy
arguments do not respond to Congress' legitimate reasons for holding
imported poultry to the exact federal standards: uniformity in the
market, enhanced consumer confidence, and the "traditional advan-
tage[s] associated with 'bright line' rules."'11
The majority concluded its opinion by stating that "policy choices
are for Congress-not the courts," and even though the Secretary had
advanced solid arguments that an equivalency standard is the better
standard, "it simply is not the role of the court to decide which of the
other two branches has proposed the preferable rule."" 2 The majority
believed that Congress had clearly indicated that the language "the
same" excluded an equivalency standard, and that even if it was a bad
decision, Congress, not the Secretary, still had the right to make it. 1 3
B. Reasoning of the Dissent
The dissent, on the other hand, found that the Secretary's regula-
105 Id.
106 Id at 308.
107 Id
108 Id.
109 1. at 308-09.
110 Id. at 309.
1II Id.
112 Id. at 310.
113 Id&
19951
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tion clearly passed the Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
test, 114 and thus would uphold it. 115
Judge Higginbotham began the dissenting opinion with a discus-
sion of methodology. 116 He noted that there are "two tools of choice"
for judges who seek to go beyond the text and act improperly in an
activist capacity.117 The first is to ignore the text by using a "flood of
legalisms and words that abstract and shrink the visage of textual com-
mand-often accompanied by unguided meanderings through legisla-
tive history."118 The second and more dangerous way to escape the
text is "to turn the enterprise on itself by an exacting literalism that
refuses to read words in context."1 19 He believed that the majority had
overreached its bounds and, in doing so, used both of these
methods.'2 0
The case is simple, the dissent maintained, yet the majority in-
sisted on a literalism that produces absurd results, like demanding
"identical processes and identical plants," despite the common sense
reading of "the same" to mean the same level of quality that all domes-
tic poultry meets, whether by the federal program itself or by state pro-
grams that are equivalent.121 The dissent asked what the Department
of Agriculture can do under the majority opinion, for "reading the stat-
ute to insist upon identical standards is a virtual ban on importation of
poultry," an absurdity that the majority does not address directly. 122
The sheer physical impossibility of implementing and enforcing identi-
cal facilities and identical conditions caused the dissent to doubt the
plausibility of the majority's arguments.12 3 The dissent concluded that
the majority's opinion thus harbors a "latent congressional purpose of
trade protectionism" 12 4 which was never discussed directly by
Congress.
1. Standard of Review
With respect to the proper standard of review to be used, the dis-
sent stated that the question was not "whether we would select the defi-
nition of 'same' that the Secretary did . . . [but] whether Congress
chose among the above definitions."1 25 Chevron dictates that it is only
114 See infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chevron test.
115 Mississippi Poulty, 31 F.3d at 312 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 310 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
117 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
118 Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
"9 Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting) ("Until today... I had never seen both techniques
appear in a single opinion.").
121 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 312 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting). The dissent identified three categories of
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if the statute is ambiguous that the Secretary has the authority to eluci-
date a specific provision by regulation, and only if that interpretation is
reasonable must a court defer to it. 12 6 "Under this approach," Judge
Higginbotham wrote, "I would have thought the validity of the Secre-
tary's definition of 'same' beyond question." 127 The dissent thus be-
lieved that the meaning of "same" in the statute was not clear, and that
the Secretary's definition was a reasonable interpretation. 128
2. Text
The dissent began its discussion with a textual analysis and a state-
ment of the crux of the case: "the PPIA subjects foreign poultry to the
'same' standards, and requires that such poultry be produced under
the 'same' conditions and in the 'same' facilities as domestic poul-
try." 129 The Secretary's regulation defined "same" as "at least equal
to."' 30 Therefore, the dissent said that the decision before the court
was whether the Act and the regulation conflict.' 31
The dissent proceeded by first analyzing the various dictionary
definitions for "same" and deciding which would most plausibly have
been used by Congress in the PPIA.132 The dissent recognized that
one of Webster's definitions for "same" was "identical," 133 but posited
two practical and functional reasons for believing that Congress never
intended this meaning. The first reason was that requiring identical
standards and identical facilities would bar foreign poultry produced
under conditions and in facilities superior to American ones.13 4 Sec-
ond, an identical standard, because of the cost involved in retooling
foreign systems, would have the effect of banning imported poultry,
and since Congress never indicated that it meant the PPIA to be a pro-
tectionist statute, it must not have intended such a result. 135
Webster's also defined "same" as "not different in relevant essen-
tials," or "equivalent."136 Again, the dissent applied a functionalist
analysis to this definition, reasoning that requiring imported poultry to
be produced under at least equal conditions, facilities, and standards
as our own would result in imported products that are equally safe for
definition: (1) "selfsame," indicating unity of identity, (2) "identical," and (3) "not different
in relevant essentials," "similar," "equivalent." Id. at 311-12 (Higginbotham, J. dissenting).
126 See id. at 312 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
127 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
13 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 311-12 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 311 n.11 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2007 (1st ed. 1961) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]).
134 Id. at 311-12 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 312 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing WEBsrER's, supra note 133, at 2007).
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consumption as domestic products.13 7 The dissent believed that "[t ] he
Secretary's definition therefore comports with the most plausible defi-
nition of the word 'same' as used in Section 466(d) of the PPIA.' 38
3. Structure of the PPIA
The structure of the PPIA was discussed next. The dissent con-
tended that the majority committed a major error in its structural anal-
ysis, an error brought about by a tendency to overlook the plain and
common sense meaning of the language.139 According to the dissent,
the PPIA does not set out two separate sets of standards, but in reality
sets up a system in which all domestic poultry, whether interstate or
intrastate, meets uniform standards. The only difference between in-
terstate and intrastate is that one must operate under the direct super-
vision of federal regulators, whereas the other operates under the
supervision of the states.140 The key is that state systems and the fed-
eral program both result in the "same floor [of] quality."141 There-
fore, the dissent reasoned, the fact that the statute says "same" without
indicating that there are more than one set of standards reveals that
Congress recognized that there is, in fact, only one domestic stan-
dard.1 42 So when Congress demanded "the same," it simply required
that imported poultry meet that single foor of quality.143
4. Legislative History
The dissent pointed out that the 1985 amendment to the PPIA
originally contained the term "at least equal to," and that it was Sena-
tor Jesse Helms' initiative on the Senate floor that struck out the
phrase and replaced it with "the same as." 144 There are two reasons,
according to the dissent, for the lack of debate or comment in the
Senate. First, there already existed in the minds of Senators a unity in
domestic standards; no one asked which domestic standard because
there was only one. "It is a floor below which no domestic poultry...
may fall." 145 Second, Senator Helms stressed that his change was only
a "technical" and "clarifying" change; if Senator Helms intended his
amendment to create a protectionist measure in the bill, he did not
indicate that in any way.146 That is to say, if the Senate had realized
137 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 313 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 312-13 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 313 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
143 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting) (quoting 131 CONG. Rac. 33,358 (1985) (statement
of Sen. Helms)).
145 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 313-14 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). This is all that Senator Helms offered:
The amendment.., changes the provision relating to inspection of imported
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that Senator Helms was introducing a whole new protectionist barrier,
surely such a change would have been mentioned and openly debated.
In addition, the dissent pointed out that Senator Helms' altera-
tion did not in fact reflect the concerns of the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee, since the Committee explicitly desired an equivalency
standard. 147 The Committee's concern was to strengthen regulations
on imported poultry which does not meet U.S. standards and has not
"been processed in facilities and under conditions at least equal to those
under which similar products are processed in the United States." 148
5. Subsequent Enactments
As for subsequent legislation, the dissent conceded that Congress
responded to the Secretary's equivalency standard by stating in the
1990 Farm Bill that the regulation "does not reflect the intention of
Congress" and urging the Secretary "to repeal the October 30, 1989
regulation."1 49 But the dissent maintained that to have any effect on
the Secretary's regulation, Congress should have either amended the
PPIA directly or made a finding as to Congress' intentions at the time
the 1985 amendment passed.150 The dissent relied upon Pierce v. Un-
derwood'5' as providing the Supreme Court's answer on how to assess
the value of subsequent legislation: "If th[e] language [of the 1990
Act] is to be controlling upon us, it must be either (1) an authoritative
interpretation of what the [1985] statute meant, or (2) an authoritative
expression of what the [1990] Congress intended." 152
NAFTA's effect was also taken up by the dissent. The majority had
argued that because the NAFTA Act Amendments put "same" and
"equivalent" in the disjunctive,' 53 there must be a difference of mean-
ing between the two terms or Congress would not have included
both. 154 The dissent, however, maintained that even though they do
mean the same thing, there was a reason for the superfluity of terms:
"[NAFTA] could not stand still for an uncertain future day when we
poultry products to provide that imported poultry must have been processed in
facilities and under conditions that are the same as those under which similar
products are processed in the United States. This change clarifies the provi-
sion to reflect the original intent of the provision as adopted by the committee
in markup.
131 Cong. Rec. 33,358 (1985) (statement of Sen. Helms).
147 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 314 n.22 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 99-145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
339-40 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 2005-06).
149 Id. at 314 n.23 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507,
104 Stat. 3359, 4069 (1990)); see also supra notes 93-95.
150 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 314 n.22 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
151 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
152 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 315 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Pierce v. Un-
derwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988)).
153 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
154 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 303-04.
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would offer a final interpretation" of "same."1 55 Because the interpre-
tation of section 466(d) was still pending in the courts, the language in
NAFTA had to cover all contingencies. Caution, therefore, was the
reason for the superfluity. 156 Therefore, NAFTA is not conclusive
proof that "same" and "equivalent" have separate meanings. 157
6. Policy
The dissent employed policy considerations throughout its opin-
ion as a tool of statutory construction. 158 The question before the
court was what Congress intended by "same." The reasoning was that
if one interpretation of "same" produces an absurd result, Congress
must not have meant that. Pointing out the absurdities that would re-
sult if "same" was interpreted as "identical,' the dissent concluded that
"identical" is too far from the realm of practicality to make any
sense. 159
III. Background Law
Because the majority and dissenting opinions in Mississippi Poultry
have such different views of the structural scheme of the Poultry Prod-
ucts Inspection Act, it is necessary to briefly summarize the history of
the Act and the most important cases and precedents on which the
Fifth Circuit relied.
A. History of Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)
1. The Original Act
In 1957 Congress enacted the PPIA, 160 which established a com-
prehensive federal program for the regulation of poultry products. 16 1
Its stated purposes were to protect consumers from diseased and un-
wholesome poultry and to protect domestic producers from being un-
dercut by lower-quality and lower-priced products.' 62 Administration
of the PPIA was placed under the control of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, who was authorized to promulgate regulations necessary for car-
rying out its provisions.' 63 The PPIA did not extend to products sold
in intrastate commerce, but only regulated those products destined for
the national market.
155 Id. at 315 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 310-12 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
160 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
161 For example, the PPIA covers inspection, id. § 455; sanitation, id. § 456; labeling, id.
§ 457; prohibited acts, id. § 458; punishment, id. § 461; imports, id. § 466; and monitoring
provisions, id. §§ 467-470.
162 Id. § 451.
163 Id. § 463(b).
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As for imported products, the PPIA set down a very broad stan-
dard, proscribing products that were found "unhealthful, unwhole-
some, or adulterated," and granted the Secretary broad discretion to
promulgate regulations accordingly.164
2. The 1968 Amendments to the PPIA
In 1968 Congress amended the PPIA to extend its regulation to
poultry produced and sold in intrastate commerce.' 65 Under the
amendments, the Secretary was to offer state inspection programs,
technical and laboratory assistance, training, and partial funding.' 66
Poultry inspected under this type of program could then be offered for
sale intrastate if the program was "at least equal to" the federal one. 167
The standards for imported poultry were not altered by the 1968
amendments; the PPIA retained only the "unhealthful, unwholesome,
or adulterated" language.' 68
3. The 1972 Change in Regulations
The Secretary revised the regulations regarding standards for im-
ported poultry in 1972.169 Under the new standard, imported poultry
was to be proscribed unless the foreign standards, systems, and condi-
tions were "at least equal to" the federal system of poultry inspection in
the United States.' 70
4. The 1985 Farm Bill and Corresponding Regulations
In 1985, Congress amended the PPIA as part of the Food Security
Act (1985 Farm Bill) to provide that imported poultry "shall . . . be
subject to the same inspection, sanitary, [and] quality . . . standards
applied to products produced in the United States" and shall "have
been processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as
those under which similar products are processed in the United
States." 171
164 Id. § 466(a).
165 Congress was able to include intrastate products by finding that the sale of any un-
wholesome, adulterated, or misbranded poultry "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, § 2, 82 Stat. 791 (1968) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 451 (1988)).
166 21 U.S.C. § 454 (1988).
167 Id. § 454(a), (c).
168 Id. § 466(a). The House Report states the reason for this: "more stringent regulation
of imports.., could hamper the exportation of U.S. slaughtered poultry and poultry prod-
ucts, the volume of which far exceeds the imports." H.R. REP. No. 1333, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3426, 3428-29.
169 Previously, the Secretary had used a "substantial equivalent of" standard. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 81.301 (1972).
170 7 C.F.R. § 81.301 (1972).
171 1985 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1701, 99 Stat. 1354, 1633 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 466(d)(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Bill came into the Senate with the "at least equal to"
language, but the chairman of the Senate committee, Senator Jesse Helms, made "technical
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The Secretary published an interim regulation in 1987 in which
the "at least equal to" standard was used, 172 and two years later pub-
lished the final rule with that same language. 173
5. The 1990 Farm Bill
In 1990, Congress enacted Section 2507 of the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation and Trade Act (1990 Farm Bill), 174 in which it addressed
the Secretary's interpretation, stating that "the regulation promulgated
by the Secretary... with respect to poultry products offered for impor-
tation into the United States does not reflect the intention of the Con-
gress." 175 Congress then urged the Secretary to "repeal the October
30, 1989 regulation and promulgate a new regulation reflecting the
intention of Congress." 176
B. Relevant Case Precedent
The most important case bearing on Mississippi Poultry is Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,177 which sets the standard of
review. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.178 also
plays a role in the opinion, it being relevant to textual analysis.
1. Judicial Review
In Chevron, the Court reviewed Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulations that allowed states to treat all of the pollution-emit-
ting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were
encased within a single "bubble." 79 The unanimous view of the six
participating members of the Court was that the EPA regulations were
based on a reasonable construction of the term "stationary source.' 180
In reaching this conclusion, the Court established a two-step method
for judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute that it ad-
ministers.181 The threshold inquiry is whether Congress clearly ex-
pressed its intent in the plain language of the statute. 8 2 "If the intent
and clarifying" amendments to the Bill, striking the "at least equal to" standard and replacing
it with "the same." See 131 CONG. REC. 33,358 (1985); see also supra note 146.
172 52 Fed. Reg. 15,963 (1987).
173 54 Fed. Reg. 43,948 (1989). Specifically, the Secretary interpreted the language in
section 466(d) of the Act to require that "the foreign inspection system must maintain a
program to assure that the requirements referred to in this section, at least equal to those
applicable to the Federal System in the United States, are being met." Id. at 43,951.
174 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69.
175 Id. at 4069.
176 Id.
177 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992).
179 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840; see also 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 0)(1) (1983).
180 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866; see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 172(b) (6), 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6)).
181 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
182 Id. at 842.
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of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress."18 3 In deciding whether the intent of Congress is clear,
courts are to employ the traditional rules of statutory construction.18 4
If, but only if, the language of the statute is determined to be either
ambiguous or silent on the particular issue, is the reviewing court to
proceed to the second Chevron inquiry: "whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 8 5 As long as the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, the court should defer to that
interpretation and not impose its own construction on the statute. 8 6
2. Textual analysis
Boston & Maine'87 plays an important part in the textual analysis
that the Fifth Circuit employs. In Boston & Maine, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) contended that the statutory term "re-
quired" meant "useful or appropriate," and not "indispensable or
necessary" as understood by the railroad company.1 8 8 The Court de-
ferred to the ICC's interpretation under a Chevron analysis, saying that
"It]he existence of alternative dictionary definitions of the word 're-
quired,' each making some sense under the statute, itself indicates that
the statute is open to interpretation."' 89 This does not mean, however,
that Boston & Maine stands for a per se dictionary rule, in which any
word with an alternative definition is automatically ambiguous; 9 0
rather, Boston & Maine itself instructs reviewing courts when interpret-
ing a statute to look "to the structure and language of the statute as a
whole."'91
IV. Significance of the Case
If the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Mississippi Poultry withstands fur-
ther review, it will indeed have great significance for the poultry indus-
try. Whether the opinion will stand, however, may depend upon the
relative strength of the arguments of the majority and the dissent.
The dissent is animated throughout its opinion by a concern for
practicality and functionality. It looks at the language in question in
the PPIA and the Secretary's regulation and assumes that Congress
and the Secretary intend their actions to have practical effect.' 92 The
183 Id. at 842-43.
184 Id. at 843 n.9.
185 Id. at 843.
186 I& at 844.
187 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992).
188 I& at 1402.
189 1&
190 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (1994) (ex-
plicitly stating that Boston & Maine does not stand for a dictionary rule).
191 Boston & Maine, 112 S. Ct. at 1401 (citations omitted).
192 See generally Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 310-12 (5th Cir. 1994)
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majority on the other hand, is much less willing to assume that Con-
gress is sensible in its actions, yet purports to be averse to making a
"policy choice."193 The question is which side is more persuasive in
the end?
A. Standard of Review
Both the majority and the dissent accurately state the applicable
standard of review of an agency's regulation: the Chevron test.19 4 It is
clear that both understand Chevron's basic mandate.' 95
B. Textual Analysis
Both the majority and dissent apply a textual analysis and ask
themselves what the dictionary and common usage have to say about
the word "same." However, in the end, the dissent's practical ap-
proach seems to be the more persuasive analysis.
First, although the majority maintains that common usage ex-
cludes "equal to" as a meaning for "same,"' 9 6 many would question the
assertion. 19 7 To reason that "identical" has as a synonym "same," is not
to rule out the fact that "same" can have as a synonym "equal." The
majority seems to have confused itself when it maintains that "the
phrase 'at least equal to' as used in the PPIA inescapably infers the
existence of a difference."' 98 Common usage simply does not unam-
biguously exclude the term "equal" as a definition for "same."
The majority's contextual reading, however, does have some per-
suasive power. The argument is that "same" is to be distinguished from
"equal" for the reason that Congress has used "at least equal to" as its
term of art in a different place in the PPIA, and chose not to use "equal
to" in the section on imports when it could have chosen that lan-
guage. 19 9 The weakness of such an argument is made apparent, how-
ever, by the functionalism of the dissent's approach: requiring
"identical facilities" and "identical conditions" would be incredibly ex-
pensive for foreign producers, with the very real possibility that there
will be no corresponding increase in safety or quality.20 0 The dissent
questions why identical process need be demanded when we can get
(en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's insistence on a literal
interpretation of the "same" in the context of standards of quality is at odds with a more valid
common sense interpretation).
193 Id. at 310.
194 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (setting forth a two-step analysis to determine the propriety of an agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute); see also supra part III.B.1.
195 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 44-46 and 125-28.
196 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 300.
197 See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
198 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 295 (emphasis omitted).
199 Id. at 300.
200 Id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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identical results with an equivalency standard. 20 1 It then answers its
own question: the only reason for such a provision is to protect not
consumers, but profits for the domestic industry by effectively shutting
out competition from abroad. 20 2
C. Structure/History of the PPIA
The majority argues that the structure of the PPIA reveals that if
the Secretary's interpretation is upheld, foreign producers would be
given a great advantage over domestic producers, a result surely Con-
gress did not intend.203 But this structural argument fails because of
its faulty premise. The dissent appears correct in its analysis that "[t]he
majority's interpretive problems arise because the complex regulatory
scheme it envisions is the product ofjudicial inventiveness that denies
effect to plain language." 20 4
As the majority represented the matter, the Secretary had two
choices with respect to imported poultry. 20 5 In reality the Secretary
had more. The majority says that he could have chosen either the in-
terstate federal program itself or the intrastate standard, which is "at
least equal to" the federal program. 20 6 The fact is that Congress, in
1957, in 1968, in 1972, and right up until the 1985 amendment, always
treated imported poultry as a category distinct from all domestic poul-
try.207 In fact, in the 1972 regulations the Secretary was actually
tougher on foreign producers than Congress and the PPIA re-
quired. 20 8 The majority represents the Secretary's move to an
equivalency standard in 1972 as a decrease in stringency applied to
foreign producers, 209 when in reality he was strengthening a "substan-
tially equivalent" standard to an "at least equal to" requirement.210
The major error committed by the majority, however, is in failing
to see the difference between standards and processes. The majority
labors under the idea that there are two sets of standards which the
Secretary oversees: federal standards and state standards. The truth is
that there is only one set of standards, and they are equal, but that
there are two different types of processes: the federal program, which
provides for direct supervision of federal regulators, and state pro-
grams which are under the direct supervision of the states. All domes-
tic poultry must meet the same standard; it is a basic floor of quality, as
201 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
203 Id at 301-02.
204 Id. at 313 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 301.
206 Id.
207 See supra part III.A.
208 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
209 Mississippi Poulty, 31 F.3d at 297.
210 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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the dissent says. 211 Poultry destined for the interstate market meets
that floor by complying with the federal program, while poultry des-
tined to remain intrastate meets it by complying with the state
programs.
Moreover, because Congress in Section 466(d) of the PPIA says
"same" standards without specifying federal or state, it would seem to
indicate that there is only one set of standards. 212 Section 466(d) does
not distinguish between the two. The dissent, therefore, is correct in
maintaining that the problematic nature of the majority's arguments is
caused by creating a more complex regulation than is actually
present.213
D. Legislative History
The majority and dissent are in complete accord concerning the
facts surrounding the legislative history of the 1985 Farm Bill; yet they
draw diametrically opposite conclusions from it. The majority cannot
understand how the fact that no debate or discussion took place can
mean anything but complete unanimity in the minds of the Senators;
the dissent cannot understand how the fact that no debate occurred
on a change that would have major ramifications can mean anything
but complete misunderstanding. The majority almost ridicules the
conclusion drawn by the dissent,214 yet it is the majority's conclusion
that is more problematic.
Before section 466(d) was passed in Congress, there was no record
of congressional criticism of the "at least equal to" standard, and no
mention of any different standard. In fact, the Agriculture Committee
sent the bill to the Senate with an equivalency standard.215 The very
first time that the phrase "the same" came into play was when Senator
Helms, on the Senate floor, offered an amendment to the bill, chang-
ing "at least equal" to "the same as."2 16 Senator Helms explained that
his change was "purely technical" and was meant only to "clarif[y] the
provision to reflect the original intent of the provision as adopted by
the committee in markup." 217 If he meant his change to "same" to
indicate "identical," which would certainly result in a major change in
trade policy, then surely he would not have represented the change as
"purely technical;" and surely if anyone took his alteration as introduc-
ing a major trade change-a change which would make exportation to
211 Mississippi Poulty, 31 F.3d at 312 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
212 See supra note 23 for the text of§ 466(d)(1).
213 Mississippi Poulty, 31 F.3d at 313 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
214 Id at 306.
215 S. REP. No. 99-145, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 516 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1660, 2182.
216 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.




the United States prohibitively expensive-they would have discussed
it or at least commented on it at this time.218 The dissent is persuasive
on its point that this congressional silence cannot be taken as unani-
mous approval for an identicality standard, that is, for holding foreign
producers to the U.S. federal regulatory program.2 19 Senator Helms
either did not intend an identicality standard or brilliantly slipped in
language which, by its equivocal nature would pass the Senate without
debate, yet plant a seed for later destruction of the very standard for
which it was passing itself off, the equivalency standard. In sum, the
only effect that an identicality standard has which is different from an
equivalency standard is to force foreign producers to change their sys-
tems at great cost and with no guarantee that the foreign systems are
not already equal or better. Since this is the only effect of an identical-
ity standard, surely it would have been debated on the floor. Because
it was not, it must be questioned whether identicality was really Con-
gress' intent.220
E. Subsequent Enactments
The majority argued that both the NAFTA Act Amendments221
and the 1990 Farm Bill 222 support the conclusion that Congress meant
"identical" when it said "same." The majority's use of the NAFTA Act
Amendment is unconvincing, but its use of the 1990 Farm Bill, on the
other hand, is a persuasive argument. In attempting to discount the
importance of the 1990 Farm Bill, the dissent seems to shift, for the
first time, from common sense reasoning to more technically-based
arguments.
1. The NAFTA Amendments
The NAFTA Amendments indicate that poultry imports from Can-
ada and Mexico are to comply with standards that are "the same" as
those in the United States, or be subject to standards that are
"equivalent" to U.S. standards. 223 The majority's argument, that be-
cause Section 361 (e) of the NAFTA Act put "same" and "equivalent" in
the disjunctive they must not mean the same thing,2 24 fails for two rea-
sons. First, since Congress passed the Implementation Act in an expe-
dited process, it is clear that there was no time to wait for a final
determination from the courts as to whether "same" in Section 466(d)
218 See id. at 313-14 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
219 I& (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
221 NAFTA Act, supra note 89, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 361 (e), 107 Stat. 2057, 2123-24
(1993).
222 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69.
223 See supra note 96.
224 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text for the majority's argument.
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of the PPIA meant identical or equivalent.2 25 Because NAFTA's con-
forming amendment to that section of the PPIA had to cover all con-
tingencies, it is only natural that it covers "same" and "equivalent."
2 26
The fact that the terms are put in the disjunctive, therefore, does not
prove in itself that "the same" means "identical."
Moreover, even if the majority were correct in interpreting "same"
as "identical," the NAFTA Act Amendment would produce an anoma-
lous result with respect to Canada and Mexico which the majority does
not address.2 2 7 If "same" and "equal" mean different things, then the
very terms of section 361 (e) give Canada and Mexico an option be-
tween two standards. Those two countries, therefore, would possess an
advantage over producers from every other country if they alone are
allowed to use a weaker standard.
2. The 1990 Farm Bill
The 1990 Farm Bill,2 28 on the other hand, is more difficult for the
dissent to overcome, and it must rely on technical arguments. Con-
gress stated in direct and unequivocal language in the Bill that the
Secretary's "equal to" regulation does not reflect the intention of Con-
gress, and that it should be repealed and replaced with a regulation
that reflects section 466(d)'s "same" language.2 29 This legislation
passed both houses.2 3 0 The dissent employs Pierce v. Underwood231 to
say that the Farm Bill is not controlling since it is neither an authorita-
tive expression of what the 1985 statute meant by "same," nor an au-
thoritative expression of what the current, 1990, Congress intended.2 32
This is the one place in which the dissent is met with a strong, func-
tionally-based argument from the majority. Why should Congress be
expected to change or reaffirm its language if the statute is already
clear and unambiguous as is?233
F. Policy
The majority does not distinguish between making a policy choice
and using policy in coming to a reasonable judicial decision. The ma-
jority basically ignores policy considerations, on the ground that to
consider such concerns would be to usurp the role of the legislative
branch.2 34 The dissent's use of policy as a tool of statutory construc-
225 Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 315 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Hig-
ginbotham, J., dissenting).
226 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
228 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Star. 3359, 4068-69.
229 See supra note 93 for the text of the Bill.
230 See Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 302; see also text accompanying notes 94-96.
231 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
232 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
233 Mississippi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 302 n.51.
234 I& at 310.
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tion, on the other hand, is a proper use of policy, and one which in
this case produces a more defensible result.
Ironically, it is the side which professes to take a more limited
role, and professes aversion to making policy choices, that actually
makes a choice in policy of the sort that should be made by the the
legislature as representative of the people. 23 5 Conversely, it is the side
that uses policy considerations in attempting to discern Congress' in-
tent that actually retains its proper role in the judiciary and merely
interprets law rather than making it.
V. Conclusion
It is tempting to see the eight to seven split in the Fifth Circuit as
evidence in itself that the term "same" is unclear. The dissent makes
some very strong points with respect to text, structure, legislative his-
tory, and policy which the majority simply cannot counter; one obvious
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the language in section 466(d)
is very problematic.
The real question presented by Mississippi Poultry, however, is
whether Congress wants foreign producers to comply to the letter with
the U.S. federal regulatory program for poultry inspection. If so, Con-
gress should say so in a clear and unequivocal way. Since both the
majority and the dissent in Mississippi Poultry agree that it would be
virtually impossible for foreign producers to comply with the federal
regulations, 2 36 Congress should know that such an imposition will have
the practical effect of banning foreign poultry from the U.S. market.
Congress has two choices with respect to imported poultry: (1) It
can require it to meet an equivalency Standard, which is the best policy
decision since it will ensure quality without the draconian and ineffi-
cient imposition of regulations which will not ensure a difference in
quality results anyway; or (2) It can unequivocally require foreign pro-
ducers to make their plants identical to U.S. plants and use processes
identical to those in U.S. plants; that is, openly set up a requirement
whose practical effect is so expensive that it is prohibitive for foreign
poultry producers.
But Congress has hit upon a third option, an option which is sup-
ported now by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Mississippi Poultry: simply
have the courts invalidate a reasonable regulation and make a pro-
nouncement that a very problematic statutory term is in fact a clear
and unambiguous term. Senator Helms, on the Senate floor, has
slipped language into the statute which sounds clear and reasonable
and purports to be only a "technical" change, but which is in fact
equivocal; where one of the meanings supports a drastic policy change.
235 As the dissent pointed out, the majority has "simply grafted onto the PPIA its own
policy concern." Id. at 314 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
236 See id. at 301 n.45 (majority); id. at 311 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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The ambiguous term then provides plaintiffs with a textual basis upon
which to argue that one of the meanings of the term is in fact the only
meaning. Thus the courts are forced to decide. Here, the Fifth Circuit
is duped, and so affirms as clear and unambiguous a phrase which
should never have gotten into the statute in the first place. The practi-
cal effect is that the court has done for Senator Helms and the domes-
tic poultry industry that which might not have been able to be done
openly. And because it is the courts that have done Congress' dirty
work, foreign nations hurt by the Fifth Circuit's holding will see the
U.S. courts, rather than Congress, as the bad guys.
There is no reason that Congress cannot clear this whole problem
up once and for all by debating the issue openly and choosing lan-
guage that is clear; in fact, Congress could have avoided the problem
from the beginning by simply using the term "identical" in section
466(d) rather than the ambiguous term "same."
To hold the statute clear and unambiguous as the Fifth Circuit
does in Mississippi Poultry is to make the wrong decision and for the
wrong reasons. The plaintiff Poultry Associations seem to have won.
Yet, ironically, this opinion may produce the ultimate backlash against
them. The Secretary knows it is bad policy; the dissenting members of
the Fifth Circuit know it; even the majority implies that it is un-
sound.2 37 Bad policy cannot last very long. By winning, the Poultry
Associations have forced the debate into the open, where the ques-
tioned language may be least able to withstand scrutiny. The absurd
results of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Mississippi Poultry will provide
an impetus for either the Supreme Court to reverse the Fifth Circuit
and hold the language of section 466(d) ambiguous, or for Congress
itself to debate the issue fully, and all its practical consequences, and
make an open decision on its policy for imported poultry.
DANIEL P. O'BRIEN
237 Id at 310.
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